Source: Business Express
As Namibia stands on the cusp of an energy revolution, propelled by world-class offshore oil discoveries, the government has moved decisively to modernise the legal framework governing this lucrative sector. The recently tabled Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Amendment Bill, 2025, has been rightly heralded as a landmark step towards transparency, efficiency, and robust regulation. However, a closer reading of the legislation reveals a more profound and potentially controversial undercurrent: a significant and deliberate consolidation of executive authority, subtly reshaping the balance of power within the Namibian state.
On the surface, the Bill is a textbook example of good governance reform. It proposes the establishment of a new, technically adept Upstream Petroleum Unit (UPU) within the Office of the President, headed by a Director-General and Deputy Director-General. This aims to streamline oversight, enhance regulatory clarity, and ensure decisions are informed by expertise. Minister of Industries, Mines and Energy, Hon. Modestus, emphasised these points in his parliamentary statement, championing the Bill’s role in aligning Namibia with international best practice and attracting responsible investment. Measures to strengthen ethical conduct, mandate parliamentary reporting on royalty concessions, and ensure continuity for existing licenses further paint a picture of progressive, investor-friendly legislation.
Yet, the devil, as they say, is in the legislative detail. Buried within the extensive textual amendments of Act 2 of 1991 is a quiet but seismic transfer of authority. The Bill systematically replaces the term “Minister” with “President” in numerous sections, particularly those relating to high-stakes financial concessions like the remission, deferral, or refund of petroleum royalties (Sections 63, 64, 65). While the President must consult the Minister of Finance, the ultimate decision-making power is elevated to the highest office.
More strikingly, the role of the former Commissioner for Petroleum Affairs—previously appointed by and answerable to the Minister—is abolished. Those powers are transferred to the new Deputy Director-General of the UPU. Crucially, both the Director-General and Deputy Director-General are to be appointed directly by the President under Article 32(3)(i)(hh) of the Constitution, “on such terms and conditions as the President may determine.” The Bill explicitly states that the President “shall not delegate” the powers of providing policy direction and making these key appointments.
This architectural shift has two major implications. First, it removes a layer of ministerial and, by extension, direct parliamentary accountability from the daily governance of the petroleum sector. The UPU, though it must report annually, is housed in and answers ultimately to the Presidency, not a ministry accountable to the National Assembly. Second, it centralises immense technocratic and regulatory influence within an office that operates under the principle of executive prerogative.
Proponents will argue that this structure is necessary for swift, coordinated, and technically sound decision-making in a complex and competitive global industry. Placing the unit under the Presidency could cut through bureaucratic red tape and ensure that national strategy is implemented without ministerial fragmentation. The required asset disclosures by the Director-General and Deputy Director-General to the President, and expanded conflict-of-interest rules, are safeguards against malfeasance.
However, governance analysts and opposition voices may view this as a concerning dilution of checks and balances. Parliament’s role, while preserved through annual reporting on royalty concessions, becomes more retrospective. Its direct influence over the sector’s primary regulators is diminished, as the appointment of the UPU leadership bypasses parliamentary oversight processes that typically accompany senior ministerial appointments. The “efficiency” gained comes at the cost of a degree of democratic transparency and legislative scrutiny.
This centralisation also raises questions about the future role of the Ministry of Mines and Energy itself. With its historic regulatory powers stripped and transferred to the Presidency, the Ministry’s function may become more policy-oriented or focus on other mineral resources, marking a notable reconfiguration of bureaucratic influence.
Namibia is at a pivotal moment. The promise of oil wealth brings with it the peril of the “resource curse,” where governance failures can lead to economic distortion and corruption. The Amendment Bill is undoubtedly an attempt to forestall this by creating a competent, modern regulator. Yet, in its design, it has chosen a path of executive consolidation over dispersed authority. It bets that the integrity of the Presidency and the professionalism of the UPU will be sufficient guarantees for the nation.
As this Bill moves through the August House for debate, the discussion must extend beyond the welcome rhetoric of transparency and efficiency. It must grapple with this fundamental question: In the quest to expertly manage the golden goose of oil, is Namibia inadvertently placing too many eggs in one basket? The future of the nation’s wealth and sovereignty may depend on the answer. The story of this Bill is not just about regulating oil; it is a subtle but significant chapter in the ongoing story of Namibian democracy itself.
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Author: admin
Managing the Namibia Oil and Gas Platform